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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider an all-too-common story. A dictator of a poor country borrows 
liberally from international donors, nominally to fund development projects. 
Some fraction goes to development projects, but a larger share ends up in the 
hands of the elites who are part of the dictator’s governing coalition or in the 
dictator’s Swiss bank account. At the same time, the dictator is misgoverning 
the country, not undertaking health and educational expenditures that could 
enhance the well-being of the citizens of the country, further enriching himself 
and his supporters from domestic sources. As the foreign debt and the dictator’s 
personal riches add up, it increasingly looks as if the debt cannot be paid. 
Lending stops, the dictator’s government collapses, and the country struggles to 
establish new democratic institutions. The new democracy tries to make the 
debt payments but finds that they draw away from necessary spending on social 
services to meet pent-up demands. The government becomes unstable; the 
democracy waivers and eventually collapses. 
In this story, the dictator has taken not just the present but also the future, 
dooming the country’s democratic institutions in their infancy. Why then should 
the new democratic government pay the dictator’s debts, even those made in 
the name of the nation? To put it in more concrete terms, why should the 
citizens of Zaire be saddled with the debt of Mobutu Sese Seko, under whom 
the country accumulated over $12 billion in sovereign debt, while Mobutu’s 
personal assets reached $4 billion? Why should Filipinos today be responsible 
for the $28 billion in sovereign debt left by Ferdinand Marcos, who left his heirs 
a personal fortune of $10 billion? 
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The standard international-law response is that states, not governments, are 
responsible entities.1 So, for instance, when a country signs an international 
treaty, it is not the government but the state that is bound, and the obligation 
will stand until a subsequent government formally exits the treaty. Exit is 
presumed to be costly: a government that “repudiates” earlier treaty obligations 
will suffer reputational harm in its international relations.2 This general 
background norm of international law applies as well to debt: a government can 
announce that it is renouncing debt, but it will suffer severe reputational harm 
in the debt marketplace, much as a government that repudiates public 
international law obligations suffers a reputational harm. In addition, assets of 
the repudiating state can be seized abroad, so there will be real enforcement of 
the obligation. There is, as yet, no form of sovereign bankruptcy to allow debtor 
nations to escape obligations.3 
A. The Odious Debt Problem 
At times, major powers—invoking what has come to be known as the 
doctrine of “odious debt”—have argued that new regimes should not be 
responsible for debts incurred by old ones. After the Spanish-American War, 
for example, the United States argued that neither Cuba nor the United States 
should be responsible for debt incurred by the colonial Spanish government. In 
the famous Tinoco Arbitration of 1923, the panel suggested that credits 
knowingly extended to a country for a dictator who used the money for his 
personal purposes should not be recoverable.4 Recently, the fall of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq has prompted renewed calls for reviving this doctrine and 
creating an odious debt exception to state succession.5 Despite these incidents, 
 
 1. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2003). 
 2. One example is the Argentinean experience with reneging on international debt obligations. 
PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING OUT (AND IN) (2006). 
 3. See generally Conference, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The View from the Legal Academy, 53 
EMORY L.J. 657, 657–1218 (2004) (examining potential methods of sovereign-debt restructuring); 
Andrew T. Guzman, Colloquy: International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2177 (2000) (evaluating universal and territorial approaches to the adjudication of international 
insolvencies). 
 4. Arbitration Between Great Britain and Costa Rica, 1 U.N. REP. INT’L. ARB. AWARDS 369, 375–
76 (1923), reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 147, 148 (1924). 
 5. For some of the recent literature, see generally PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE 
LENDING, CORRUPTION AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991) (reviewing the 
history of odious lending); Joseph Hanlon, “Illegitimate Debt”: When Creditors Should be Liable for 
Improper Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 109 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston 
eds., 2006) (focusing on the odiousness of lending regardless of the status of the borrower); Anna 
Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391 (2005) 
(analyzing sovereign debt in Iraq and Argentina); Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious 
Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (2006) (arguing that loan sanctions, unlike trade sanctions, may prevent 
odious debt); Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine (Ctr. 
for Int’l Sustainable Dev. Law, Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/ 
odiousdebts/publications/Advancing_the_Odious_Debt_Doctrine.pdf (defining odious debt and 
arguing for cancellation of odious debt under international law); see also FOREIGN POLICY, Ranking 
the Rich, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 68, 70 (discussing Iraqi and Nigerian loan write-offs); 
06__GINSBURG_ULEN.DOC 12/6/2007  9:01:15 AM 
Summer 2007] ODIOUS DEBT, ODIOUS CREDIT 117 
the international community has not yet adopted a general doctrine of excusing 
odious debts. Rather, the default rule is that sovereign debt is to be repaid, 
regardless of the circumstances under which it was contracted or for which the 
debt was used. Whereas international powers may act in an ad hoc way to 
assume or restructure sovereign debt of favored countries, no general off-the-
shelf doctrine is available to be applied in a neutral manner across cases.6 
B. Three Responses 
Scholars who have recognized the odious debt problem have proposed 
several creative solutions. Of these, three general forms of proposed solutions 
can be identified. 
1. The “Do Nothing” Approach 
The most elemental of the proposed solutions to the problem of odious 
debt—one to which very few tie their flags—is simply to do nothing.7 An 
alternative way of stating much the same position is to hold that sovereign debt 
is always to be enforced.8 If that is the clear rule governing these matters, then 
all parties in this market are on notice and can make their own calculations of 
expected cost and benefit. The market for international debt is a sophisticated 
and ongoing competitive market. There is no obvious source of market failure 
that calls for correction. In essence, this position holds that odious debt presents 
no systematic problem in international law and relations requiring a novel 
institutional, policy, or legal solution. 
An argument in favor of a clear rule for the enforceability of sovereign debt 
begins with the observation that the parties involved in lending and borrowing 
money in international debt markets are sophisticated. They understand how to 
evaluate risk, including the risk of default; how to use contractual language and 
legal processes to protect themselves; and how to appeal to public bodies for 
relief if the law is unavailing. As a result, lenders who extend credit to nations 
ruled by despots whose successors might seek to repudiate the debt can hardly 
 
Lee. C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 
1201, 1208–24 (2007) (addressing the taxonomy of sovereign debt). 
 6. Odious debt can be seen as a special case of the more general problem of debt relief, which is 
an issue raised by many developing countries that cannot meet their debt burden. See, e.g., Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf & Paul Wolfowitz, Lift Liberia’s Debt Burden, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2007, at A25. 
 7. See generally Albert H. Choi & Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Summer 2007) (suggesting that the overall effect of the application of 
the current odious debt doctrine could potentially be negative and stating a need for more empirical 
work before instituting the doctrine).  
 8. One might argue that the opposite rule—that sovereign debt is never enforceable—would also, 
under the appropriate assumptions, lead to an optimal state of affairs. This is simply an exercise in the 
application of the Coase Theorem, which examines economic efficiency through the allocation of 
property rights and considerations of transaction costs. Note, though, that there is some evidence that 
enforceability of sovereign debt played a key role in early capitalism, underpinning the industrial 
revolution. See, e.g., Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. 
HISTORY 803 (1989). 
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complain that they were unfairly surprised by this turn of events. Rather, those 
lenders could plausibly be thought to have willingly assumed the risk of non-
payment: they assessed the likelihood of a default’s occurring and took (or 
could have easily taken) steps—such as self- or market-insurance—to protect 
themselves from loss. 
Despots seeking loans are equally adept at assessing their market 
opportunities and, no doubt, seek the best deal that they can, subject to the 
obvious fact that lenders want to be repaid. If a despot repeatedly uses loans for 
purposes other than those for which it was loaned, his access to international 
debt markets might be compromised. To the extent that despots are repeat 
players in the international debt market, they have an incentive to be 
reasonably truthful and relatively transparent to the lending community. 
If the market for international debt “works” in the sense that all relevant 
information is available, all parties are well informed, and there are no obvious 
market imperfections, then there is no particularly compelling case for third-
party intervention. 
However, there might be an external cost to a despot’s loans taken out in 
the name of his country—a cost born by the citizens who may be obliged to 
repay the loans after the despot’s departure. Those citizens cannot be fairly 
inferred to have approved of the despot’s loans—unless, of course, those loans 
were used for public projects. That is, if the despot’s loans were incurred, as in 
some of the examples above, to enrich the despot or for the furtherance of some 
folly—uses for which a democratically elected government would have been 
extremely unlikely to have incurred international debt—then there is no 
principled argument (other than that laid out in Part II) for the nation’s citizens 
to be held responsible for those debts. They could not meaningfully (as through 
election, public pressure on legislators, or expressions of displeasure in public 
fora) have prevented the loans from being incurred. And it is unlikely to be the 
case that the dictator’s loan activity is a triggering action for regime change. 
Dissatisfaction with that aspect of a despot’s rule might have been relatively 
minor in the list of complaints—that is, perhaps not enough of a dissatisfaction 
to warrant armed rebellion. So, the citizens are simply stuck with responsibility 
for a despot’s debts incurred in the name of the nation, or hopeful of simply 
reneging on the loans without damaging the nation’s access to credit. 
At first blush, this externality argument might seem to defeat the “do 
nothing” solution in favor of some internationally mediated, institutional 
method of dealing with odious debt. But further consideration might suggest 
that even the presence of unfairly burdened citizens is not really a cause for an 
international institutional solution; it might be the case that international 
donors, organizations, or nations might step in to relieve unfairly burdened 
citizens of responsibility for sovereign debt incurred by a former dictator. 
Consider this scenario. Saddam Hussein, while the dictator of Iraq, incurs 
billions of dollars in loans, ostensibly for legitimate public purposes but, in 
reality, for unsupportable purposes. He is toppled by a U.S. invasion, and an 
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unstable but roughly democratic government takes over administration of the 
country. The “do nothing” solution would argue in favor of this new 
government’s assuming the debt obligations of the Hussein government. And 
naturally the lenders who are owed millions argue that the new government has 
the resources to discharge these obligations. For example, in theory the new 
government can now sell oil freely to international buyers, something that the 
Hussein government could not legitimately do because of United Nations 
sanctions. But, just as naturally, the new democratic government argues that it 
should not have to discharge these obligations. It has obligations to rebuild the 
country from the invasion and from years of neglect under Hussein; to build or 
reconstruct schools, roads, hospitals, water and sewerage infrastructure; and so 
on. If the new, democratically elected government were obliged to discharge 
Hussein’s debts, it would have much less revenue left to undertake the nation-
building that will make the democratic government more stable. 
Suppose that there are some extraordinarily large international private 
enterprises that believe that if Iraq is stabilized, significantly profitable 
economic opportunities will result. They might therefore be willing to extend 
loans to the new Iraqi government on very favorable terms, independent of 
what is done about the problem of Hussein’s odious debt. Moreover, these 
international private enterprises might have sufficient political capital to 
persuade the lenders, who are expecting to be repaid, either to refinance or 
forgive portions of the outstanding debt or to persuade their home country 
governments to find some method of relieving the new government of the 
burden of Hussein’s debt. 
The general lesson of this brief scenario is that the possibility of future 
economic profit in a newly democratic nation and the exertion of international 
political power might relieve the unfairly burdened citizens of a national 
obligation to repay sovereign debt. One might further predict that these forces 
will come into play in precisely the circumstances in which the burden of odious 
debt would be most likely to harm the prospects of a new government.9 
2. The Ex Ante Approach 
The second class of solutions to the problem of odious debt is to try to 
identify and deal with the problem ex ante through a formal mechanism.10 In 
general, this would provide some method of identifying portions of new 
 
 9. This is a variant on the position for which we shall ultimately be arguing. To foreshadow that 
position, we find some attraction in the scenario we have just painted—that is, one in which there are 
forces compelling the relief of the burden of odious debt in those circumstances in which holding a 
nation to sovereign obligations threatens a democratic government. But we are not sufficiently 
sanguine about this possibility to leave these matters to chance. Efforts to provide relief in this manner 
may be subject to collective action problems among those seeking to do so. So, we argue in favor of a 
more explicit relationship between forgiveness of odious debt and the process of democratization. 
 10. See, e.g., Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 5, at 1. 
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sovereign debt that would (and those that would not) survive a regime change.11 
Because the borrower—in this instance, a despot—would not have the 
appropriate incentives to reveal his true intentions for the loan, identifying the 
points of bargaining could not be left to the parties. Rather, some neutral third 
party (or tribunal)12 would have to identify which fraction of the loan was odious 
debt and which was not, or which regimes would be characterized as 
presumptively odious. This would have to be done early enough in the 
bargaining process between lender and borrower that the terms and conditions 
of the loan—say, its interest rate—could be adjusted in light of the tribunal’s 
findings. The theory is that by identifying odious debt ex ante, there will be not 
only a chilling effect on both lenders and borrows in extending odious debt, but 
also fewer grounds for dispute later on. 
One interesting question is when a regime should be labeled as odious.13 On 
the one hand, labeling a regime as odious early in its tenure is likely to minimize 
damage from the regime’s bad performance. On the other hand, waiting will 
reduce the risk of mislabeling a regime, as more information on odiousness 
becomes available. Furthermore, waiting will make international consensus 
easier to develop and will minimize market uncertainties. There is also the 
problem of regime behavior shifting over time. It is likely that rulers with 
shorter time horizons will be more prone to looting their countries. This 
complicates the time calculation for assessing odious debts. 
Although it is not impossible that this ex ante certification scheme could 
develop into a viable method of dealing with the problem of odious debt, its 
effectiveness is doubtful. The evidentiary basis on which to designate portions 
of a loan package as odious ex ante is not at all obvious. There are several 
reasons for this belief. 
First, no borrower, despotic or otherwise, is going to reveal in complete 
candor what he intends to do with the proceeds of an international loan, and he 
will certainly be wise enough not to reveal odious aspects of the loan. Even 
Saddam Hussein was able to convince U.N. inspectors that he was using 
sequestered oil sale revenues for humanitarian purposes, a claim now known to 
be very wide of the truth.14 Surely the borrower will be able to manufacture all 
sorts of attractive public projects for which he needs international loans, while 
concealing the real plans for the money. And it is unlikely to be easy for lenders 
to make inquiries that will reveal the true plans for the funds. 
The second reason that evaluating debt packages ex ante is so difficult is the 
absence of any metric by which the rule can realistically or should in theory be 
 
 11. In current practice, either all of a sovereign debt is deemed odious or none of it is. For the 
purposes of this article, however, the assumption will be made that fractions of debt can be designated 
odious and nonodious. 
 12. See Jayachandran & Kremer, infra note 15 (proposing a tribunal for this purpose). 
 13. Stephania Bonilla, A Law-and-Economics Approach to Odious Debts 20–22 (paper prepared 
for 23rd EALE Conference, Madrid, Spain, 2006, on file with authors). 
 14. See JEFFREY A. MEYER & MARK G. CALIFANO, GOOD INTENTIONS CORRUPTED: THE OIL 
FOR FOOD SCANDAL AND THE THREAT TO THE U.N. (2006). 
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applied. Will (or should) the tribunal give an overall odious score to the loan 
on, say, a one-to-ten scale? Will (or should) it be the case that if some portion 
of a loan package is deemed odious, then the entire package should be deemed 
odious? And what would or should the threshold be for determining what 
proportion of a loan package’s odious provisions deems the entire package 
odious—twenty percent by value, thirty-three percent, fifty percent? 
Furthermore, even if the tribunal did succeed in designating a particular 
debt offering as “odious,” it is doubtful that this would estop subsequent 
disputes between the lenders and the country if there were regime change. 
Indeed, litigation galore about such matters as whether the tribunal adequately 
considered all the evidence or whether the assertions of the despot-borrower 
were treated skeptically enough would likely ensue. These ex post disputes are 
all the more likely in view of lenders’ limited opportunities to monitor the 
borrower’s behavior during the course of the loan. So, if odious uses of a loan 
come to light, they are only likely to be revealed after the despot has left the 
scene, and by the efforts of the successor government. 
3. The Ex Post Approach 
The third and final class of solutions to the problem of odious debt is to deal 
with the problem ex post. The most frequent suggestion of this sort is to create 
an international tribunal to adjudicate between lenders and nations regarding 
whether the unpaid sovereign debt is odious.15 Just as the ex ante designation of 
all or part of sovereign debt as odious is fraught with problems of 
administrability, so, too, is the ex post adjudication of sovereign debt as odious 
and, therefore, excusable. No doubt interest rates would increase because of the 
risk of being declared odious in the future or of being mistakenly labeled 
“nonodious.” Whereas interest rates would increase more steeply for the 
authoritarian regimes that had the potential to be labeled odious, all borrowers 
would have to pay increased rates. Ironically, this effect might be hardest on 
poorer countries, for which the marginal cost of interest rate increases is higher. 
It is possible, however, that the administration costs of this ex post 
demonstration would be less than those of the ex ante designation. The central 
claim would likely be that the loans had been acquired under fraudulent 
pretenses—an allegation that is reasonably easy to demonstrate—as opposed to 
the exceedingly difficult ex ante demonstration that the loans were not those 
that a duly elected democratic government would have entered into in the first 
place. 
 
 15. Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION POLICY 
BRIEF #103 (July 2002) (calling for a third-party adjudicator to determine whether debt is odious), 
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb103.htm; Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts 
or Odious Regimes? 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007). 
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4. An Alternative Approach: The Roles of the “Odious Creditor” and of 
Economic Development and Democratization 
Unfortunately, none of these proposals for dealing with indefensible 
sovereign debt has commanded, or is likely to command, a majority scholarly or 
public following. Odious debt is still a major policy problem, and this article 
proposes alternative mechanisms for finding a solution. 
This article recognizes two dimensions of the odious debt problem that have 
received too little attention—the potential role of the “odious creditor” and the 
connection between obligations to repay sovereign debt and the process of 
economic development and democratization. First, consider the role of “odious 
creditors,” which we define as government creditors willing to make loans to 
despots as part of a calculated strategy of national politics. One example is the 
Chinese government’s support for the regimes in the Sudan, which itself is 
associated with the ongoing genocide in Darfur. China has extended billions of 
dollars in loans to the Sudanese government in an effort to secure a favored 
position as a buyer of natural resources. Needless to say, China would be 
unlikely to support debt forgiveness should a democratic regime ever emerge in 
the Sudan. The odious creditor complicates the development of solutions to the 
problem of odious debt. Recognizing this connection between international 
relations and the problem of odious debt casts doubt on the workability of the 
ex ante and ex post structural solutions discussed above. 
Second, there is an explicit connection between the problem of odious debt 
and the related processes of economic development and democratization. The 
arguments in favor of furthering economic development are so obvious and 
those in favor of democratization are so compelling that a sensible solution to 
the issue of odious debt should explicitly consider the extent to which 
forgiveness of odious debt can significantly further these objectives. 
The arguments for approaching the odious debt problem are made here in 
several stages. Considered first, as a threshold point, is the quasi-constitutional 
issue of why state succession makes sense in international law and how carving 
out an exception to this doctrine affects the development and democratization 
of debtor nations. Second, this article briefly examines the arguments in favor 
of economic development and the role of democratization in development. 
Third, the article discusses the odious creditor problem and argues that it is 
unlikely that international law will ever acknowledge an odious debt doctrine as 
a general matter. We also express skepticism about the United Nations as a 
forum for addressing the issue. Fourth, this article elaborates on what we 
believe is a workable solution that relies on existing institutions and avoids the 
problem of the odious creditor. A concluding section summarizes. 
II 
WHY STATE SUCCESSION TO INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IS NECESSARY 
A threshold question in the odious debt debate is why states ought to be 
responsible at all for debts incurred previously. That is, why should today’s 
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citizens ever be responsible for earlier debts incurred by their political 
predecessors? Mitu Gulati and his co-authors deal with this issue in their article 
on the taxonomy of debt, pointing out that one reason to support successor 
liability is that the successors have benefited from the earlier investments.16 This 
presents a morally unproblematic case. In other cases, such as the kind of debt 
labeled odious, it is not so obvious why the successors should be obligated. They 
have not, after all, benefited at all from the money, nor did they have a role in 
choosing the rulers who made the decision to borrow. Rather, they simply had 
the bad luck of succeeding bad rulers, and their populations the misfortune of 
having been “born under a bad sign.” 
One needs, then, a broader theory of how state succession relates to 
democracy. An initial argument is that state succession facilitates international 
exchange and domestic state-building by facilitating credible commitments.17 
The intuition is simple: a promise at Time 1 has value only if the promisee 
believes that it will be obeyed at Time 2. For governments that enter into treaty 
commitments, their counterparts may be unwilling to count on the obligation’s 
being upheld if subsequent governments might not perform the promise. This 
problem is particularly acute when the promising state actors are uncertain 
about the incentives they, themselves, will face in the future.18 If costs and 
benefits vary in unpredictable ways, a politician’s promise to behave in a 
specified way may be less believable. A doctrine of state succession facilitates 
international cooperation by making the promises of all states more believable 
to other states.19 
Note that the function of state succession is more important for democracies 
than for dictatorships. Democracies are by definition characterized by 
governments that come and go. Dictators do go but typically have a longer time 
horizon than democratic governments. For example, the Chinese Communist 
Party has been able to make sufficiently credible promises to attract massive 
amounts of foreign investment even in the absence of an independent legal 
system. Investors understand that the Party, like the House of Saud and other 
institutionalized authoritarian regimes, has a long time horizon. If the doctrine 
 
 16. Buchheit et al., supra note 5, at 6–21 (addressing the taxonomy of sovereign debt). 
 17. For scholars making this argument, see, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: 
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36–111 (1979); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: 
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT AND CONSTRAINTS 129–41, 157–61 (2000); STEPHEN 
HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134–77 (1995); 
Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 195–240 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). But see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT (1998) (arguing that disagreements should be solved by decisionmaking between 
right-holders); Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagreement, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 271–99 
(Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (criticizing Holmes and Elster). 
 18. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? 
DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995) (exploring 
domestic uncertainty through information games and game theory). 
 19. Of course subsequent governments can exit the obligations by withdrawing from or denouncing 
the treaties that contain the commitments. Doing so, however, entails political costs. See Laurence R. 
Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005). 
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of state succession did not exist, then democracies would be at a disadvantage in 
the international sphere because contractual counterparts would be less willing 
to trust that the successor governments would uphold the obligation. 
An underappreciated dimension of state-succession doctrine is that it not 
only facilitates commitment to international audiences, but also to domestic 
ones. That is, politicians may in some circumstances choose to convey promises 
to domestic constituents in international instruments rather than in domestic 
ones. Consider this negative example: by joining the World Trade Organization, 
politicians signal to domestic constituents their inability to enact special 
protections for domestic producers against foreign competitors. In this sense, 
some international agreements parallel national constitutional structures.20 
International obligations are particularly attractive in some circumstances 
precisely because of state succession to obligations. Political actors who have 
trouble making credible commitments in the domestic sphere may prefer to 
make promises through an international obligation. This feature is, however, 
particularly crucial for new democracies and new states that have few other 
means of making credible promises.21 Thus, state succession to international 
obligations helps increase the power of those commitments that states do enter 
into, facilitating both international cooperation and domestic constitutionalism. 
This form of commitment beyond the state is particularly useful for new 
democracies. Imagine a newly democratic government that emerges after an 
authoritarian regime and promises to protect the human rights of its own 
citizens. The citizens might believe the government, but they might also be 
concerned that the promise will not be kept by the new government’s 
successors. The government can make its promise more credible by embedding 
it in an international treaty to respect human rights. Any future government 
that violates the human rights of its citizens will suffer some form of sanction, 
either as an effect on its international reputation or possibly even as formal 
enforcement mechanisms. This helps explain why new democracies are 
particularly prone to include provisions for international obligations in their 
constitutions: state succession facilitates democratic commitments. 
 
 20. CASS SUNSTEIN, WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 241 (2001) (“Democratic constitutions operate as 
‘precommitment strategies’ in which nations, aware of problems that are likely to arise, take steps to 
ensure that those problems will not arise or that they will produce minimal damage if they do.”); see 
also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 179 (1960) (“[The reason for 
constitutions] is that all men in the pursuit of immediate aims are apt—or, because of the limitation of 
their intellect, in fact bound—to violate rules of conduct which they would nevertheless wish to see 
generally observed. Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate purposes will 
always loom large, and we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them.”); STEPHEN HOLMES, 
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 135 (1995) (arguing that 
constitutional restraints facilitate democracy and that liberal theory provides a foundation for 
democratic government); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding The Constitution: An Economic 
Analysis Of Tradition’s Role In Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 447–49 (1999) 
(discussing the efficiency purposes of constitutionalism, including precommitment). 
 21. Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law, 38 
NYU J. INT’L L. & POLITICS 707 (2006). 
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One could, of course, carve out a category of international obligations that 
should not be honored. But such a carve-out would undercut the making of 
commitments by those states most in need of credibility, namely new 
democracies. These states will find that their credibility for both domestic and 
international audiences is more enhanced if there are fewer carve-outs that are 
more rarely invoked.22 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, a carve-out creates administrative 
problems—mainly those of developing a principled set of criteria for 
distinguishing odious from nonodious debt. After all, odious debts can be 
“laundered” by international financial institutions (IFIs), as in the case of the 
Congo after dictator Mobutu Sese Seko left the country in arrears to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).23 Several governments gave the Congo 
bridging loans to repay the IMF, which then extended new credit for the Congo 
to repay the donating countries for the bridging loans.24 
In short, state succession is a useful doctrine, not just for promisees but also 
for promisors. Credibility helps precisely those countries that lack other 
mechanisms for making promises believable, both to international and domestic 
audiences. Efforts to create a carve-out regime are noble, but have substantial 
line-drawing problems. Furthermore, any plausible and administrable carve-out 
will likely increase the price of debt for all countries because it introduces 
additional uncertainty in the debt market. 
III 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
Because economic development and democratization are necessary criteria 
for dealing with the doctrine of odious debt, it is worthwhile, very briefly, to 
make the case for development and democracy and the link between them. In 
Integrating a Theory of the State and Sovereign Debt Restructuring,25 Robert 
Rasmussen identified the necessary connection between a nation’s governance 
system and the desirability of restructuring the nation’s debt when there is 
distress from sovereign-debt service. That analysis can be extended to the 
particular problems associated with economic development and odious debt. 
The case in favor of economic development is almost too obvious to need 
elaboration.26 Nonetheless, briefly put, there are a significant number of people 
whose lives would be greatly improved by additional income and wealth. The 
 
 22. An unintended consequence of any carve-out regime is that it will increase debt prices for all, 
odious or not. 
 23. Joseph Hanlon, ‘Illegitimate’ Loans: Lenders, Not Borrowers, Are Responsible, 27 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 211 (2006); Hanlon, supra note 5, at 123. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Robert Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State and Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1159 (2004). 
 26. See The World Bank, PovertyNet Overview, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:20153855~menuPK:373757~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~t
heSitePK:336992,00.html (last visited May 22, 2007). 
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World Bank has established two threshold measures of poverty—living on one 
dollar or two dollars per day—and reports that nearly half of the earth’s 
population is living at or below the latter level. The costs of poverty itself are 
daunting, from dramatically high rates of infant mortality and illness27 to 
dramatically low life expectancies.28 And yet, amazingly, it is trivially 
inexpensive to address most of the issues—infant mortality, disease, and 
malnutrition—resulting from extreme poverty.29 At a minimum, being wealthier 
means being healthier. To put this dramatically, a study by Lant Pritchett and 
Larry Summers found that “the deaths of about half a million children in 1990 
would have been averted if Africa and Latin America’s growth in the 1980s had 
been 1.5 percentage points higher.”30 
Not only is economic development better in terms of eradicating the effects 
of poverty, but development is better for citizens’ psyches. The evidence is 
accumulating on the relationship between self-reported happiness and per 
 
 27. William Easterly makes a compelling case for why poverty is to be avoided: “The typical rate of 
infant mortality in the richest fifth of countries is 4 out of every 1,000 births; in the poorest fifth of 
countries, it is 200 out of every 1,000 births. Parents in the poorest countries are fifty times more likely 
than in the richest countries to know grief rather than joy from the birth of a child. . . . The higher rates 
of babies dying in the poorest countries reflect in part the higher rates of communicable and often 
easily preventable diseases such as tuberculosis, syphilis, diarrhea, polio, measles, tetanus, meningitis, 
hepatitis, sleeping sickness, schistosomiasis, river blindness, leprosy, trachoma, intestinal worms, and 
lower respiratory infections. At low incomes, disease is more dangerous because of lower medical 
knowledge, lower nutrition, and lower access to medical care. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE 
QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS 8–9 
(2001). 
 28. Statistics from the HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 indicate differences in life 
expectancies vary dramatically across regions and countries: life expectancy at birth in Sierra Leone 
today is 34.5 years, whereas it is 81.3 years in Japan. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003: MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS 
TO END HUMAN POVERTY 237, 240, available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/. Another 
measure of this can be found in our own history. In 1900 the combined average life expectancy for men 
and women in the United States was 47.3 years. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
HEALTH, UNITED STATES 2006 176, available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf#027. 
Approximately one hundred years later, in 2001, the average life expectancy for males was seventy-four 
years and for women, eighty years. Id. at 310. And it is said that a female baby born today in Japan or 
France has a fifty percent change of living to one hundred. See Jim Oeppen & James W. Vaupel, 
Broken Limits to Life Expectancy, 296 SCI. 1029 (2002); James Meek, Health Crisis Looms as Life 
Expectancy Soars, GUARDIAN, May 10, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/medicine/ 
story/0%2C11381%2C713141%2C00.html (explaining Vaupel’s extrapolated findings). 
 29. Oral-rehydration therapy, which would address the issues of dehydration caused by, among 
other things, diarrhea, costs less than ten cents per dose. Rehydration Project, Oral Rehydration Salts, 
http://rehydrate.org/ors/index.html (last visited May 22, 2007). Vaccinations against a range of 
debilitating diseases—pertussis, polio, diphtheria, measles, and tetanus—cost between twenty and 
thirty dollars per child. UNICEF, Facts on Children: Immunization, http://www.unicef.org/ 
media/media_9479.html (last visited May 22, 2007). Vitamin A capsules cost about two cents each. 
UNITED NATIONS CHILDRENS FUND, WORLDMUN ISTANBUL 2001 at 5, available at 
http://www.worldmun.org/2006/archives/01/xcomunicef.pdf. Iodizing salt supplies cost about five cents 
per affected person per year. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK REVIEW 
2005, available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADB_Review/2005/vol37-4/simple-
solutions.asp (last visited May 22, 2007). And intestinal parasites can be cured with inexpensive drugs. 
 30. Lant Pritchett & Lawrence Summers, Wealthier is Healthier (World Development Report, 
Working Paper No. 36, 1993), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/ 
WDSP/IB/1993/06/01/000009265_3961004215604/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 
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capita income. The World Values Survey of over 100,000 people in over ninety 
countries, including developing countries, found a robust correlation between 
increases in per capita income and self-reported happiness.31 Somewhat less 
obvious is the connection between economic development and democratization. 
There is a consensus among students of economic growth—a belief known as 
the “Lipset hypothesis”—that democratization is not a precondition for the 
early stages of development.32 Indeed, there is some evidence that democracy 
may make the early stages of growth faltering and messy.33 Powerful individuals 
and interest groups may use the nascent democratic process to their advantage, 
while the ability of the government to implement public-spirited reforms may 
be severely limited. So, in the early stages of growth, it may well be the case that 
an enlightened despotism is more efficient than a new democracy. 
Eventually, however, democracy may be necessary for sustained economic 
growth. This may be the case when the government has become more mature in 
its ability to resist blandishments from powerful individuals and interest groups 
or when corruption has been brought under control. An additional virtue of 
democracy at a later stage is that a large enough number of interest groups may 
have formed so that politics can provide a competitive arena in which no one 
group or coalition is able to dominate the governmental structure. Some 
theorists claim that an example of this in a developing society is when an urban 
commercial class becomes strong enough to grab a share of democratic power 
away from the landed interests who controlled the society before development 
began in earnest.34 
 
 31. See WORLD VALUES SURVEY, EUROPEAN AND WORLD VALUES SURVEYS FOUR-WAIVE 
INTEGRATED DATA FILE 1981–2004 (2006), available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org (follow 
“Findings” link, then “Collection of Graphs Presenting WVS Data” link to the tenth chart); see 
generally BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW THE ECONOMY 
AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT HUMAN WELL-BEING (2001). The correlation is robust only up to an 
annual income of approximately $15,000. Beyond that figure there is still an increase in reported well-
being that comes from additional income, but those increases come at a steeply diminishing rate. Id. at 
83. 
 32. See Tom Ginsburg, Democracy, Markets and Doomsaying: Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable? 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L., 310 (2004) (reviewing AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE 
MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003)). On the history 
and theory of democracy, see generally JOHN DUNN, SETTING THE PEOPLE FREE: THE STORY OF 
DEMOCRACY (2005). 
 33. See, e.g., ADAM PRZEWORSKI, MICHAEL E. ALVAREZ, JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB & 
FERNANDO LIMONGI, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-
BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950–1990, 142–86 (2000) (discussing political regimes and economic growth). 
 34. See, e.g., KARL DE SCHWEINITZ JR., INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY (1964) (arguing 
that historically democracy developed through economic gains of the commercial class and their 
subsequent demands for a larger share of political power); see generally Kenneth A. Bollen, Political 
Democracy and the Timing of Development, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 572 (1979) (arguing that greater state 
control of the economic system leads to lower levels of democracy in the political system); LARRY J. 
DIAMOND, JUAN J. LINZ & SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Introduction: Comparing Experience with 
Democracy, in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH 
DEMOCRACY 1 (Larry J. Diamond et al. eds., 1990) (exploring links between politics and democracy in 
the developing world). 
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The purpose in summarizing even these few studies on economic 
development and democracy is to invoke those goals as criteria for a principled 
approach to managing odious debt. Both development and democratization are 
valuable, and both of these goals are likely to be at issue in each instance in 
which a nation seeks to be excused from some portion of its sovereign debt. 
That is, odious debt is most likely to be an issue for developing countries that 
have recently shifted their regime from one of despotism to democracy. 
IV 
THE PROBLEM OF THE ODIOUS CREDITOR 
Proposals for solving the odious debt problem should be seen not as purely 
legal doctrine, but as attempts to achieve admirable foreign policy goals related 
to development and democratization. It follows that international relations 
matter a good deal for understanding the feasibility of potential solutions: one 
must consider the incentives for major international players that would have to 
acquiesce to the formation and implementation of a new doctrine of odious 
debt. A particularly significant problem in this regard—one of increasing 
importance in the current international debate—is the problem of the “odious 
creditor”: states that have no interest in advancing democratization goals but 
that are significant lenders to other states. 
After much optimism in the 1990s about the spread of democracy, it is clear 
that dictatorships are playing an increasingly important role in the global 
political economy. China is a crucial player in that Chinese decisions to finance 
American debt enable American profligate macroeconomic policy to continue, 
in turn generating demand for Chinese goods. China now sits on $1.1 trillion of 
U.S. dollar reserves and is using this to finance regimes that have trouble 
obtaining credit from the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral 
sources.35 
Rich authoritarians are unlikely to acquiesce to a doctrine that penalizes 
other authoritarians. China has shown itself to be generally unconcerned about 
the character of regimes it deals with in its insatiable demand for raw resources. 
China is the single biggest supporter of the Sudanese government, which is 
enabling genocide in Darfur. Even if the democratic nations on the U.N. 
Security Council wished to move forward with aggressive sanctions against 
Sudan, the Chinese would likely block them.36 Another example is the Chinese 
support for the regime in Angola, which is Africa’s second largest producer of 
oil after Nigeria and has been described as “one of the most corrupt and 
 
 35. Moises Naim, Rogue Aid, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 96. 
 36. See China, Russia Bar Sudan Sanctions, BBC NEWS, Apr. 18, 2006, available at 
http://news/.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4917970.stm (discussing China’s refusal to impose sanctions on 
Sudanese officers); John Prendergast & Colin Thomas-Jensen, Blowing the Horn, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 59, 73 (explaining Beijing’s reluctance to lean on Khartoum). 
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impoverished countries in the world.”37  Corruption and transparency concerns 
led the International Monetary Fund to cease lending to the government, but 
China stepped in to provide finances, secured by Angola’s oil reserves.38  China 
also recently hosted a summit for 1,500 leaders and forty-eight heads of state 
from of the African continent, including such luminaries as Zimbabwe’s Robert 
Mugabe.39 China is the primary sponsor of the government in Myanmar,40 
significantly hindering two decades of American attempts to turn that 
government into a pariah. China is thus an ally of many of the regimes that 
might be declared odious under current proposals, and it is in a particularly 
favorable position to extend credit to those regimes. 
China is not the only autocracy in such a position. While less significant on a 
global scale, smaller countries such as Venezuela and Iran have emerged as 
regional powers whose coffers are filled with oil monies and who have limited 
interest in democratization at home. Venezuela’s oil surpluses have been 
recycled to Cuba, providing much-needed hard currency that sustains the 
regime two decades after the end of the Soviet Union.41 The boom in oil and 
other “point-source” natural resources—those drawn from a narrow geographic 
area, which tend to be associated with negative governance outcomes like civil 
war and corruption—has empowered all kinds of governments and encouraged 
 
 37. John Reed, Angolan Oil Loan Likely to Raise Transparency Issues, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, 
at 13 (quoting the non-governmental organization Global Witness). 
 38. Id.; Angola: Oil Backed Loan Will Finance Recovery, IRIN Africa, Mar. 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=53112. See generally Steve Kibble, Angola: Can the 
Politics of Disorder Become the Politics of Democratisation & Development?, 109 REV. AFRICAN POL. 
ECON. 525, 528–29 (2006) (describing Chinese loans as undermining international leverage, 
undercutting civil society, and serving as core obstacles to development). We are grateful to our 
colleague Pat Keenan for drawing this issue to our attention and for providing extensive 
documentation. 
 39. See Simon Elegant, Beijing Hosts Africa’s Leaders: Just Don’t Mention Darfur, TIME.com, 
Nov. 3, 2006; see also Luis Ramirez, China Defends Decision to Invite Sudan, Zimbabwe to Africa 
Summit, VOICE OF AM., Nov. 3, 2006, available at http://www.voanews.com/tibetan/archive/2006-
11/2006-11-03-voal.cfm. 
 40. See generally UN Votes to Put Burma on Agenda, BBC News, Sept. 16, 2006 (discussing China’s 
opposition to the U.S.-backed placement of Burma on the Security council agenda), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5351246.stm; see also U.S. – CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY 
REVIEW COMMISSION, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS, 78, 109th Cong. (2006), available at 
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/annual_report_full_06.pdf (equating the strong economic 
relationship between China and Burma with “keeping the Burmese economy afloat in the face of 
international sanctions.”). 
 41. See generally Michael Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POLITICS 325, 356 (Apr. 
2001) (concluding there is a negative correlation between a country with large number of oil reserves 
and democratic governance); CENTER FOR ADVANCED DEFENSE STUDIES [CADS], VENEZUELA’S 
GROWING APPETITE FOR REGIONAL POWER (2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/ 
details.cfm?lng=en&id=26991; John Simpson, Iran’s Growing Regional Influence, BBC WORLD NEWS, 
Sept. 20, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/5363098.stm; see also CUBA 
TRANSITION PROJECT, HOW VENEZUELA SUBSIDIZES THE CASTRO REGIME, Issue 10 (2005), 
available at  http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FACTS_Web/Cuba%20Facts%20Issue%2010%20April% 
202005.htm (estimating Cuba’s total value of imported Subsidized Oil from Venezuela at $940 million 
in 2004). 
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odiousness.42  A distinctive characteristic of such resources is that they have a 
relatively low elasticity of demand, which means that the quantity demanded of 
those resources is relatively insensitive to changes in prices. As a result, regimes 
with oil (or diamonds, for example) have poor human rights records and are 
relatively insulated from international criticism and condemnation.43 
There is no reason to think that any of these countries would support the 
emergence of an odious debt doctrine. China’s foreign policy is based on 
longstanding concerns of sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs 
of other states.44 This matters a good deal, since, as a permanent member of the 
U.N. Security Council, China is in a position to block or slow the emergence of 
international legal doctrines that seek to punish regimes of any particular 
character. We think this fact poses a fatal objection to the proposal put forward 
by Professors Bolton and Skeel.45  Bolton and Skeel believe the United Nations 
Security Council can provide an effective forum for identifying and regulating 
odious regimes. They recognize that there will be some “false negatives” in the 
form of odious regimes not declared as such because of political 
considerations.46  In our view, however, the real issue is whether there will be 
any “true positives.”  The Security Council is not an exclusively cooperative 
institution, but rather a complex arena of political competition and cooperation. 
One needs to make a strong affirmative case based on the incentives of its 
members to demonstrate that the Security Council can be an effective forum for 
advancing the odious debt proposal. 
Even beyond political obstacles, the odious debt doctrine may strengthen 
the position of China and other odious creditors vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes. 
Dictators will seek to borrow from relatively benign creditors rather than risk 
non-recovery from Western sources with their moral agendas. And if Western 
powers stopped lending to such countries, China would be able to fill the void 
and gain significant political leverage over other autocracies. Lending from 
other governments can be crucial in maintaining odious regimes—in the case of 
Saddam’s Iraq, only a small proportion of debt was held by private creditors.47 
There is already some evidence that a club of autocracies is emerging. In 
Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, founded in 2001, brings together 
Russia, China, and various central Asian dictatorships to talk about common 
 
 42. Jonathan Isham et al., The Varieties of Resource Experience: How Natural Resource Export 
Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth (Middlebury College Discussion Paper 
No. 2003-08, Apr. 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410364. 
 43. Id.; See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUDAN, OIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2003), available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/hrw-sud-25nov.pdf (exploring how Sudan’s poor 
human rights record was partially driven by the desire to control oilfields, and criticizing foreign 
government support throughout the human rights abuses). 
 44. Samuel S. Kim, The Development of International Law in Post-Mao China: Change & 
Continuity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 117, 148–49 (1987) (describing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). 
 45. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 15. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Patricia Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 526 (Sept. 2004) at 5, 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-526es.html. 
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views and to participate in military cooperation.48 If, for example, Uzbekistan 
were declared an odious regime such that credits extended to it might not have 
to be repaid in the event the government fell, the regime would certainly still be 
able to attract capital and development assistance from Russia, China, and 
another potential member, Iran. The odious debt doctrine, perversely, could 
strengthen autocracies and contribute to their economic integration as a 
counterbalance to the industrial West. 
The problem of the odious creditor ought to trouble those who are 
committed to the odious debt doctrine. Because China will likely block the 
formal emergence of universal norms against the collectability of odious debt, 
the doctrine will likely emerge only among a subset of countries, the industrial 
democracies, which no longer dictate the price of sovereign debt. To the degree 
the industrial democracies remove themselves from the global lending picture, 
they increase the incentives of a “rogue creditor” with deep pockets, such as 
China, to enhance its geopolitical and economic influence. The Washington 
Consensus may be giving way to a “Beijing Consensus.”49 Whatever this means 
for economic well-being, this shift can hardly help the long-term cause of 
democracy. 
V 
A MODEST SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ODIOUS DEBT 
So far we have argued that the odious debt proposal is best understood as 
part of the broader foreign policy objectives of economic development and 
democratization. Although a policy that would make odious debt uncollectible 
would, according to proponents, raise the cost of capital for authoritarians and 
prevent new democratic regimes from being burdened with heavy debt, it is 
unclear whether such a new legal doctrine can be created in a world of “odious 
creditors.” 
Even so, the modest proposal presented here could help advance some of 
the goals of the odious debt proposal without encountering some of the severe 
challenges to administrability raised above. Suppose that the international 
community identifies foreign debt as a crucial barrier to the democratization of 
a post-dictatorial regime—say, Iraq. Two distinct problems have to be faced: 
First, how can friends of development and democracy ensure that the country 
maintains a solid credit rating in the event that it defaults on its debt? One 
possibility would be for those friends to take over the debt directly through the 
 
 48. Charter members included China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. 
Mutlaq Al-Qahtani, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Law of International 
Organizations, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 129, 130 (2006); see also Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, FRONT PAGE MAGAZINE, Aug. 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles//Printable.asp?ID=19041. See generally Richard Komaiko, The 
Great Game (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
 49. See generally RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR 
MODEL FOR THE REST? 1 (2007). 
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IMF. Although this would relieve the new democracy of the burden of debt 
repayment, it does not address the second problem, the moral-hazard problem 
of prospective creditors. Those creditors would continue to extend credit to the 
authoritarian regime, even extending its lifespan, in confidence that the debt 
would be repaid after the regime fell. 
To introduce real risk into the calculations of creditors, effective repudiation 
of the odious debt is needed—not merely transferring the debt to parties with 
pockets sufficiently deep to pay it off. Here, the best approach is not to set up 
an unwieldy new doctrine in international law, but simply to provide incentives 
in the marketplace to reduce the harm to poor countries that repudiate odious 
debts. 
Modest steps can be taken to encourage selected, carefully identified 
recipient countries to repudiate the debt. The IMF or World Bank could offer 
insurance on future loans to be extended to the country after repudiation, thus 
reducing the interest-rate penalty the country will suffer as a consequence of 
reputational harm. A useful parallel can be found in the World Bank’s 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), established after several 
decades of discussion in 1986.50 MIGA is designed to facilitate private 
investment in developing countries by offering investment insurance against a 
variety of “political” risks.51 An American equivalent is the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, an independent agency of the U.S. government that 
also offers insurance against the expropriation of invested capital by foreign 
governments. The proposal offered here, however, would be more limited, 
focusing on sovereign debt rather than on private-investment capital. The 
World Bank or IMF could set up an agency that would in essence guarantee 
debt repayment by selected sovereign borrowers. This debt insurance program 
would be applied only to very particular regimes emerging from particularly 
odious dictatorships. It does not require general legal criteria but rather specific 
political decisions within the context of multilateral lending agencies, and it 
compensates for reputational losses associated with repudiation. Decisions 
could be made relying on many of the criteria put forward in other proposals 
related to odious debt, voted on by a majority vote of international financial 
institution (IFI) shareholders.52 
The insurance that would be offered would be designed to compensate for 
reputational losses associated with repudiation by new democracies emerging 
from odious dictatorships. It would apply only to new lending directed to those 
countries and would be designed to reduce the spread between interest rates 
demanded by creditors and those prevailing under market conditions. Because 
 
 50. Alex Khachaturian, Note: “Are We In Good Hands?” The Adequacy Of American and 
Multilateral Political Risk Insurance Programs In Fostering International Development, 38 U. CONN. L. 
REV. 1041, 1050 (2006). 
 51. These include currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence. Id. 
 52. For a description of the criteria that might be used to define Odious Regimes, see Bolton & 
Skeel, supra note 15. 
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the new democracies will have recently repudiated all or some of the debt 
accumulated under the previous regime, we assume that lenders would demand 
higher interest rates on new lending. The proposed insurance scheme could 
either insure the entirety of the new loans, or simply target the additional 
interest rate so as to make the lender indifferent between lending to the new 
democracy or lending to another debtor in the marketplace. 
One objection to our proposal is that of moral hazard. There is some risk 
under our proposal that new democracies may seek to incur “too much” new 
debt because of the implicit subsidy offered by the debt insurance. However, 
the IMF is already in a position to monitor debt levels as part of its mandate to 
manage balance of payments under the Articles of Incorporation. The World 
Bank is the body in the best position to monitor whether borrowing is being 
used for development purposes. Certainly there is no better-positioned set of 
institutions in the international arena than the IFIs to address the moral hazard 
concerns. 
We believe the IMF and World Bank are better vehicles for addressing the 
odious debt problem than the United Nations.53 Potentially odious creditors 
wield veto power in the United Nations Security Council; the United Nations 
General Assembly is a highly politicized body in which nondemocracies have a 
strong voice. It is unreasonable to expect non-democracies to endorse a policy 
that is designed to promote democratization. The IMF and World Bank, on the 
other hand, are governed by Boards of Governors with weighted voting based 
on subscriptions paid or shares held.54  The largest five countries by voting 
weight in the IMF, for example, are the United States, Japan, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and France. 
Naturally, this proposal assumes that international institutions can 
effectively handle this set of goals. Currently, the articles of incorporation for 
both the IMF and World Bank do not include a mandate to encourage 
democratization. International financial institutions, and development 
assistance generally, create what might be called a “bilateral agency problem,” 
involving citizens and governments in both donor and recipient countries.55 
Citizens in one country support foreign aid and development for a variety of 
reasons—altruistic, ideational, and pecuniary. Their representatives, through 
political institutions, translate these preferences into foreign aid policy. This 
involves the transfer of resources to foreign countries, through a mix of 
international, bilateral, and private institutions, for spending on behalf of 
citizens in the recipient country. 
An agency framework illuminates one feature of foreign aid, namely that it 
is given almost exclusively by democracies. The top aid-giving countries by 
 
 53. Cf. id. 
 54. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, art. V.3; 
International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, art. XII.5. 
 55. See Peter Murrell, The Interaction of Donors, Contractors and Recipients, in THE 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF FOREIGN AID (Bertin Martens et al. eds., 2002). 
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absolute dollars are the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and France;56 the top by percentage of Gross Domestic Product is Norway.57 
Traditionally, and in contrast to the democratic nature of the donors, recipients 
have been selected without regard to the governmental structure of their 
regimes.58 Some of the biggest recipients of American foreign aid, for example, 
include Egypt and Pakistan.59 
This asymmetry between donors and recipients—of democracies giving and 
lending money to non-democracies—matters for thinking about the odious debt 
problem. International financial institutions have not explicitly incorporated 
democracy into their decisionmaking criteria or goals. International financial 
institutions are ultimately creatures of their member governments, but they are 
several steps removed from the preferences of national citizens in donor 
countries. These institutions have their own structures and sets of incentives; as 
in any bureaucracy, individual incentives may not align with the nominal 
purpose of the institution. There are many concerns about the accountability of 
international bureaucracies, many of which have ultimately not been 
answered.60 
 
 56. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OFFICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DATA FOR 2005 3, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/18/ 
37790990.pdf. 
 57. See Sanjeev Gupta, Catherine Patillo & Smita Wagh, Are Donor Countries Giving More or 
Less Aid? 5 (IMF Working Paper No. 06/1, 2006), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
wp/2006/wp0601.pdf. 
 58. To be fair, however, thinking about foreign aid as a bilateral agency problem illustrates the 
similarity across recipient regimes. No doubt the governing coalitions in all countries, both democratic 
and authoritarian, take at least a portion of the foreign aid for their own benefit and in order to keep 
together the governing coalition. But nations differ in the degree to which the aid is skimmed off. 
Probably there is less skimming in democracies than autocracies, although this is not categorically true. 
There are examples of developmental state autocracies that were, in fact, quite clean. Democracies 
suffer legion problems of interest-group politics, too; so one cannot simply assume that autocracies are 
worse. Autocracies, however, have greater variance. The main point is that the spending and borrowing 
in any recipient country is likely to be greater than the benefit received by the citizenry. This creates an 
agency problem endemic in the world of all foreign aid. 
 59. The top recipients in 2005 in order are Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Colombia, Sudan, 
Jordan, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Afghanistan and Israel are the only democracies on the list. 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT: FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF 
U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 18 (Jan. 19, 2005), available at http://www.italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/ 
other/98-916.pdf. 
 60. Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 347 (2000–2001). One particular problem is the threat of “negative net transfers.” This 
idea draws on the fact that when international development lending institutions extend loans, the loans 
must eventually be paid back. In the early years of operating in a country, the amount of money going 
in will exceed the amount being paid back. As the country develops however, the recipient becomes 
more able to pay the money back and is less in need of new credits. When funds are extended across 
many countries, a development-lending institution may eventually have more funds coming in than 
going out in new loans. And this would mean that the institution was a net drain on the resources of 
developing countries. An international development institution drawing capital out of developing 
countries is unlikely to earn the support of the citizens of rich countries. Thus, IFIs are in continuous 
need of finding new targets for loan programs. See Paul Mosley, AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK 
AND POLICY-BASED LENDING 47 (2d ed. 1995). 
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The odious debt problem thus focuses attention not only on the justice of 
having borrowers pay back lenders but also on the agency problem between 
rich world citizens and development institutions—a point that has been 
underappreciated in many odious debt discussions. Structuring less perverse 
incentives for development institutions will improve their role of monitoring the 
use of rich country citizen funds spent abroad. 
In recent years, donors have begun to pay attention to the agency problems 
involved in giving foreign aid to nondemocracies. Most of the United States’ 
increase in development aid in the past few years has gone into the Millennium 
Challenge Account (“MCA”), the Bush Administration’s innovation in foreign 
aid. The Millennium Challenge Account Framework is designed to introduce a 
form of conditionality to the modern aid situation.61 Aid is targeted especially at 
countries that have already democratized somewhat and have made progress in 
such areas as corruption control, political rights, civil liberties, rule of law, voice, 
and accountability—governance criteria relevant to effective use of the aid 
dollar.62 
The MCA has been criticized in some quarters, and funds have been slow to 
flow under it. Nevertheless, the concept of aligning incentives among rich 
country citizens, development-institution bureaucrats, and citizens in recipient 
countries seems to have great promise. International financial institutions ought 
to consider the democratic prospects of recipient countries as well as those 
countries’ development prospects in structuring policies. Setting up an 
institutional structure to facilitate selective repudiation of particularly odious 
debt by subsidizing future loans to the repudiating country will ultimately help 
the cause of democracy, advancing foreign policy as well as development goals. 
Although odious debt comes in many forms, the presence of IFIs 
significantly changes market incentives, creating a moral hazard that might lead 
private banks to loan money to countries expecting an international bailout.63 
The institutional incentives of the IFIs must be addressed in thinking about 
odious debt. The approach described in this article is more advantageous in that 
it focuses on the entities that have some control over debtor-state actions.64 And 
it does so in a way that enhances democratic accountability in rich countries as 
well as poor ones. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Consideration of odious debt should focus on three features of the 
international context. First, the odious debt doctrine should be seen as part of 
 
 61. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks on Global Development at the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Mar. 14, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/ 
20020314-7.html. 
 62. The MCA also considers metrics on basic health and human services and economic freedom. 
 63. Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 15, at 3. 
 64. Rasmussen, supra note 25. 
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an overall foreign-policy goal of democratization. Second, this focus calls into 
sharp relief the contrast between the behavior of democracies such as the 
United States and other major actors in the international sphere who have been 
only too happy to support the most odious of regimes. The problem of the 
“odious creditor” will be an increasingly important challenge as China becomes 
a major player in international financial markets. Achieving the goals of odious 
debt proponents requires consideration of this issue. Finally, a third feature of 
the international environment is the incentive structure of IFIs, whose presence 
creates a moral hazard for creditors. 
Advancing the goals of the odious debt doctrine requires making democracy 
an element of lending decisions by IFIs. International financial institutions are, 
by their charter, politically neutral institutions, but they are not subject to 
conventional market discipline. In recent years, the World Bank has become 
extensively involved in governance-promotion activities, notwithstanding its 
mandate to avoid politics. In practice, IFIs ought to help advance the foreign-
policy objectives of their ultimate principals, the citizens of rich countries whose 
national budgets contribute to the overwhelming majority of funds given to 
IFIs. Making IFIs take democracy seriously will both enhance democracy in the 
developing world and alleviate the agency problem in donor countries. 
A special fund designed to subsidize new lending by countries burdened 
with odious debt can help alleviate in a modest way some of the problems 
associated with earlier proposals. The ultimate decision to repudiate debt would 
still be made by the new democracy, but the costs of such repudiation would be 
reduced. Knowing this, creditors would think twice about lending to odious 
dictatorships, being less confident that a bailout would occur and having to 
consider the possibility of repudiation. No doubt the proposal will leave some 
moral hazard in place. Some creditors will take the risk, and odious dictators 
will continue to find sources of capital. At the margin, however, getting IFIs to 
better structure the incentives for new democracies will advance some of the 
goals of those who wish to deal with the odious debt problem. 
